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12 SEP 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Coordination
SUBJECT : Coordination of Clandestine Collection

Attached is a paper on this subject prepared as a result of my recent trip to Europe for such use as you desire to make of it. Having served during World War II in both OSS and G-2 and as Assistant Director for Special Operations, and having drafted the first revision of NSCID 5, together with Brigadier General John Magruder (USA Ret.), I have tried to approach this problem in as practical a manner as possible keeping constantly in mind the overall interests of the United States. I hope this paper will prove of value to you.

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Lyman B. Kirkpatrick
Inspector General

cc: DCI
DDCI

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SUBJECT: Coordination of Clandestine Collection of Intelligence in
The Field

1. Problem: How should the Director of Central Intelligence exercise his authority and fulfill his responsibility for the coordination of the clandestine collection of intelligence outside of the United States?

2. Legal Background: The National Security Act of 1947 gave the Director of Central Intelligence the authority to perform such services of common concern as were agreed upon by the intelligence community and approved by the National Security Council. The hearings before the House Committee considering this bill indicate clearly that one of the most important services of common concern that the Congress had in mind was the conduct of espionage and counterespionage operations overseas. There is also evidence that the Congress felt that this activity could best be conducted centrally by one Agency, although there is no question but that the Congress intended to protect departmental intelligence activities. It is not clear whether the Congress intended to include espionage or counterespionage activities within departmental rights, but it is clear that the Congress intended that the Director of Central Intelligence should coordinate all intelligence activities.

3. Historical Evolution: The problems of coordination of clandestine collection of intelligence overseas have multiplied in almost direct proportion to the spread of United States military commitments

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and responsibilities abroad. Before Czechoslovakia and China were taken over by the communists and while the United States military establishment was being reduced in size, there was not much challenge to the exclusive conduct of clandestine intelligence activities by the CIA. But the creation of NATO and the Korean War brought large U. S. military establishments overseas with sizable intelligence organizations. These military intelligence organizations had extensive requirements for information, not all of which were, or could be, answered by CIA. As a result, there was an inevitable pressure by the military intelligence organizations to get into clandestine collection. One of the results of this has been so-called "agreed activities," which, simply expressed, permits the military intelligence services to engage in clandestine collection so long as the operations are coordinated with CIA.

4. The Situation Today: The problem of coordinating the clandestine collection of intelligence activities in Europe is the most difficult to solve today, and is the one with which this paper is principally concerned. In the Far East the withdrawal of U. S. forces has lessened both the desire and ability of the military services to engage in clandestine collection. Elsewhere in the world there is little clandestine intelligence activity on the part of the services, and generally speaking the service attaches have neither the capability nor the desire to engage in clandestine activities and the MAAG's are theoretically restrained by international agreement. The situation in Europe can be briefly summarized as follows:

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a. The Commands (their areas, authority, responsibility, and requirements). There are the following military commands in Europe which have intelligence requirements which must be met:

SHAPE - Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe - Headquarters at Fontainebleau - has an international command responsibility covering the area from the Arctic Circle to North Africa and east through Turkey, with authority for the allied command in the event of hostilities with the Soviet Bloc. Its responsibilities are such that requirements extend to potential hostilities against its command--thus the capabilities and the intentions of the Soviet Union and its Satellites--as well as threats of communism and subversion within the command, that is all Western European countries, and all threats to the command or its country elements from adjacent areas such as North Africa and the Middle East.

EUCOM - European Command - Headquarters near Fontainebleau - is in effect the combined U. S. command supporting SHAPE, and its intelligence interests and requirements are the same.

CINCNELM - Commander in Chief Naval Forces Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean - Headquarters in London. While this command's authority and requirements are primarily naval covering the Atlantic approaches to Europe and the Mediterranean, as well as the capabilities and intentions of all potentially hostile naval forces, it has also great interest in the internal

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developments in countries where its ships are based, e.g., Spain, France, Italy, Greece, Turkey, etc.

USAREUR - United States Army Europe - Headquarters in Heidelberg - commands the U. S. ground forces now based in Germany. The primary concern is the order of battle of the Soviet and Satellite forces in Eastern Europe, but it is also vitally concerned with developments internally in Germany and elsewhere in Western Europe that could affect its ability to move supplies and replacements.

USAFE - United States Air Force Europe - Headquarters in Wiesbaden - has the broadest authority and requirements of all the European commands, covering an area from the Arctic Circle through the Middle East. While its primary interest is in hostile air forces and defenses, it also has considerable demands for ground intelligence such as transportation, troop concentrations, and industries to cite only a few.

SETOAF - Southern Europe Task Force - Headquarters in Verona - is basically the U. S. force which moved from Austria after the peace treaty and has the responsibility of being the blocking force against any communist attack through the Balkans. Its requirements are directed primarily toward Yugoslavia, but it is equally interested in internal developments in Italy.

b. The coordination mechanism is complicated by the variety of commands and the geographical interest.

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